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If voters are fully rational and have negligible cognition costs, ballot layout should not affect election
outcomes. In this paper, we explore deviations from rational voting using quasi-random variation in
candidate name placement on ballots from the 2003 California Recall Election. We find that the voteshares
of minor candidates almost double when their names are adjacent to the names of major candidates
on a ballot. Voteshare gains are largest in precincts with high percentages of Democratic, Hispanic,
low-income, non-English speaking, poorly educated, or young voters. A major candidate that attracts
a disproportionate share of voters from these types of precincts faces a systematic electoral disadvantage.
If the Republican frontrunner Arnold Schwarzenegger and Democratic frontrunner Cruz Bustamante
had been in a tie, adjacency misvoting would have given Schwarzenegger an edge of 0.06% of the
voteshare. This gain in voteshare exceeds the margins of victory in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election
and the 2004 Washington Gubernatorial Election. We explore which voting technology platforms
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In this paper, we use the quasi-random variation in layouts of 150 types of ballots used in 
the 2003 California Recall Election to study how different ballot designs led to systematic 
deviations in the voteshares of candidates. We refer to votes for a candidate that are solely 
attributable to that candidate’s favorable position on the ballot as misvotes because differences in 
ballot layout should not affect the decisions of fully rational voters.
1 Previous literature has 
focused on position misvotes – when candidates receive more votes because they are listed first 
on the ballot page or column. In this paper, we consider another type of misvote: adjacency 
misvotes – when candidates receive more votes because they are adjacent to a popular candidate. 
Adjacency misvotes can occur if voters accidentally select candidates adjacent to their 
preferred choices.  Evidence from simulated voting experiments suggests that some voters 
become confused by the ballot layout and voting technology and, as a result, cast accidental but 
valid votes for candidates adjacent to the intended choice of the voter (e.g., Roth 1998). These 
adjacency misvotes are especially likely if the ballot columns are unclearly marked, the ballot 
text is small, the punch card grid is confusing, or if voters slip while marking their ballots. See 
Appendix 1 for sample ballots that may produce adjacency misvotes.
2 
Misvotes are important for two reasons. First, and at a more fundamental level, misvotes 
provide insight into human cognition: While Simon’s (1955) seminal article has spurred much 
research on the limits of rational decision-making (see Conlisk 1996 for an overview), relatively 
few papers examine which types of individuals are most prone to behavioral anomalies.  We 
                                                 
1 We use rational in the traditional sense of the term: someone who has a preference ordering over candidates that is 
complete and transitive over the candidates. Implicit in this definition is that choice is not affected by cognition 
costs. 
2 It is also conceivable that adjacency misvotes can occur if voters scan quickly for popular candidates and then give 
increased consideration to candidates listed near the popular candidate.  In Table 3, we show that accidental voting 
rather than increased consideration is likely to be the primary cause of adjacency misvotes. However, our findings 
hold regardless of which process drives adjacency misvotes.   2
examine how ballot design alters voting behavior and for which types of voters these effects are 
strongest.  Following List and Reiley (2002), we assume that the rationality of voter behavior 
decreases with the cognitive cost of processing complicated ballot design. We examine how 
variation in cognitive costs across demographic groups can affect the probability of casting a 
misvote and thereby determine election outcomes. Our paper thus contributes to a relatively new 
literature that examines demographic variation in people’s decision-making abilities in real 
world situations (e.g., Madrian 2001, Choi et al. 2004, Thaler and Benartzi 2004, and Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2006). 
Second, misvotes can change election outcomes. Previous literature on position misvotes 
has predominantly focused on who gains from misvotes. King and Leigh (2006), Koppell and 
Steen (2004), and Miller and Krosnick (1998) show that candidates gain up to 2% in voteshare if 
they are listed near the start of the ballot. However, the gain from being listed near the top of the 
candidate list tends to be much smaller in well-publicized elections featuring party labels, and 
well-known or incumbent candidates (e.g., Ho and Imai 2005, Koppell and Steen 2004, Miller 
and Krosnick 1998, and Taebel 1975). Further, the bias caused by position misvotes can be 
minimized if the list of candidate names is randomized and rotated through voting districts as is 
done in states such as California, Ohio, and Kansas. Therefore, what often matters more for the 
outcome of major U.S. elections is which of the two front-runners systematically loses more 
votes to misvotes. This point is perhaps best illustrated by the unexpected large number of votes 
that Patrick Buchanan received on the “butterfly ballot” used in Palm Beach County, Florida 
during the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election. While even Buchanan himself acknowledges that   3
most of the 3,407 votes he received in Palm Beach County are due to voter mistakes,
3 the bigger 
question is whether these misvotes came sufficiently more from Al Gore than from George Bush 
to overturn Bush’s 537 vote margin of victory. Numerous studies using demographic trends and 
Buchanan’s performance in surrounding counties indicate that this was likely the case (e.g., 
Wand et al. 2001, and Smith 2002). 
  Unlike position misvotes, adjacency misvotes can offer insight into differences in 
voteshare lost by major candidates. Voteshare gained by a candidate adjacent to a major 
candidate is voteshare lost by the associated major candidate. We assess which of the major 
candidates disproportionally loses votes to adjacent candidates in two ways. First, we examine 
whether minor candidates in the vicinity of one major candidate gain as much voteshare as minor 
candidates in the vicinity of another major candidate. Second, we relate the extent of misvoting 
in each election precinct to precinct demographic characteristics and estimate whether major 
candidates that appeal to voters with certain demographic characteristics lose more votes to 
adjacent candidates. To our knowledge we are the first study that does this for a major election, 
and both methods indicate that one of the major candidates disproportionally loses votes due to 
misvoting. 
We measure adjacency misvoting by exploiting the rotational structure of ballots used in 
the 2003 California Recall Election. Candidates in the Recall Election are listed in order 
according to a randomized alphabetization in District 1, and then rotated one position at a time in 
subsequent districts. Due to the interaction between ballot rotation and each county’s unique 
page layout, there exists significant exogenous variation in whether a minor (unpopular) 
candidate’s name is adjacent to that of a major (popular) candidate. The increase in voteshare 
                                                 
3 In an appearance on the “Today” show on November 9, 2000, Buchanan said, “When I took one look at that ballot 
on Election Night … it’s very easy for me to see how someone could have voted for me in the belief they voted for 
Al Gore.”   4
experienced by a minor candidate when she is adjacent to a major candidate is an estimate of 
adjacency misvoting. We then use precinct-level voting results and demographic data to test if 
certain demographic groups are more likely to cast misvotes than others. Finally, we test if, 
controlling for demographic characteristics, certain kinds of voting technologies correspond to a 
reduction in the level of misvoting. 
The Recall Election has several desirable characteristics. First, California contains a large 
number of counties and districts that use a variety of voting technologies and ballot formats, 
allowing for maximal variation in whether a minor candidate is adjacent to a major candidate. 
Second, California rotates the long list of candidates (135 in total) one candidate at a time by 
district. This, again, allows for greater variation in terms of adjacency. Finally, a gubernatorial 
election is relatively important and well covered by the media and therefore may offer insights 
that can be extended to other major elections. 
We find that the voteshares of minor candidates almost double when their names are 
adjacent to the names of major candidates. Misvotes account for at least 0.25 percent of all votes 
cast during the Recall Election.
4 We find that the amount of misvoting depends on the voting 
technology used; punch card technologies yield about twice the level of misvotes compared to 
optical scan and touch screen platforms, which confirms findings by Dee (2006). The amount of 
misvoting also varies with voter characteristics.  Using precinct-level voter registration and 
Census data, we find that adjacency misvoting is strongest in precincts with high percentages of 
Democratic, Hispanic, low-income, non-English speaking, poorly educated, or young voters. 
After controlling for the relative popularities of the two major candidates, we find that the 
voteshare lost by the Democratic frontrunner, Cruz Bustamante exceeds the voteshare lost by his 
                                                 
4 This is a lower bound because we only consider votes gained by candidates immediately adjacent to the top three 
frontrunners in our calculation of misvotes.   5
Republican rival, Arnold Schwarzenegger, by 63%. While Schwarzenegger beat Bustamante by 
a comfortable 17.0 percentage points in the Recall Election, the disproportionate misvoting 
would have given Schwarzenegger a 0.06% advantage if both had been tied at 47% of the vote. 
This margin is larger than the margins of victory in the 2000 U.S. presidential, 2004 Washington 
gubernatorial, 1974 New Hampshire senatorial, and 1985 Indiana representative elections. 
Schwarzenegger’s advantage over Bustamante is also not much smaller than the margins of 
victory in several close U.S. elections including the 1880 and 1884 presidential elections and the 
2000 Washington and 1998 Nevada senate elections, all of which had margins of victory of less 
than 0.1%.
5 Further, our estimate of the difference in voteshare lost by the major candidates 
underestimates the difference that might occur in elections in which two major candidates are 
adjacent to each other, as is the case in many U.S. presidential elections. In such situations, not 
only does one major candidate lose more votes to adjacent candidates, these losses are accrued 
by her opponent, thereby exacerbating differences in voteshare. 
Adjacency misvotes pose a unique challenge to policy makers. While candidate list 
rotation by district can eliminate the bias posed by positional misvoting, rotation does nothing to 
reduce the bias caused by adjacency misvoting. No matter how a candidate list is randomized 
across districts, major candidates will continue to lose votes to adjacent candidates. Our results 
suggest two strategies that may reduce the level of adjacency misvotes. First, some voting 
technologies (electronic voting and certain brands of optical scan ballots) lead to lower levels of 
misvoting. Second, we find that adjacency misvotes are most prevalent when it is difficult to 
discern which candidate selection box is associated with a given candidate name. For example, 
on multi-column ballots, a single candidate name might be bordered by two selection bubbles. 
                                                 
5 Of course, adjacency misvoting is also present in elections outside the United States. Differences in voteshare lost 
by major candidates could have determined outcomes for close international elections such as the 2006 Italian and 
Mexican General Elections, both of which were decided by less than 0.1% of the popular vote.    6
Thus, clearer separation of the selection boxes corresponding to each candidate’s name may 
reduce the level of adjacency misvotes.  
  
II. The California Recall Election Dataset 
A statewide special election was held in California on October 7
th 2003 concerning the recall 
of Governor Gray Davis. Voters were presented with two recall questions: 
1.  “Should Gray Davis be recalled (removed) from the office of Governor?” Yes/No 
2.  Candidates to succeed Gray Davis as Governor if he is recalled: Vote for one” 
[List of 135 names] 
 
Voters were asked to respond to the second question regardless of their response to the first 
question. If more than 50% answer “Yes” to the first question, the candidate with the plurality of 
the vote on the second question becomes governor. Perhaps due to the low entry requirements 
(one needed only to obtain 65 signatures and pay the $3500 registration fee), a total of 135 
candidates ran to replace Governor Gray Davis. The resulting candidate list was extremely 
diverse and included such personalities as actor Gary Coleman, erotic actress Mary “Mary 
Carey” Cook, and sumo wrestler Kurt E. “Tachikaze” Rightmyer. 
Ballot format in the Recall Election was also extremely diverse. The ballot layout and 
technology was determined at the county level (58 counties). The ballot ordering of candidates 
varied by assembly district (80 districts). Because multiple counties can lie in the same district 
and vice versa, the Recall Election used 157 different ballots (county-district combinations). 
Candidates were ordered according to a randomized alphabet, 
“RWQOJMVAHBSGZXNTCIEKUPDYFL” in the first assembly district and then rotated one 
candidate at a time by district. Thus, in District 1, the order was alphabetical according to this   7
randomly drawn alphabet: Robinson, Roscoe, Ramirez, …, Leonard. In District 2, Robinson 
becomes last, and all others move up by one. This rotation continued through all 80 districts. 
Gray Davis was recalled as Governor of California (55% of voters voted to recall him). 
Table 1 shows the distribution of voteshares among the candidates running to replace him. The 
top three candidates captured a total 93.56% of the voteshare, leaving an average voteshare of 
0.05% for the remaining 132 “minor” candidates. For the remainder of this paper, we consider 
the three frontrunners, Arnold Schwarzenegger (R), Cruz Bustamante (D), and Tom McClintock 
(R) as major candidates. Inclusion of the next most popular candidate, Peter Camejo, as a major 
candidate does not significantly change the baseline results. All candidates other than the top 
three are included in the analysis as minor candidates.
6 
California uses three types of voting technology platforms: punch card, optical scan, and 
touch screen. Punch card technology requires that voters use a stylus to punch out a pre-scored 
hole corresponding to the desired candidate. Some forms of punch card technology require that 
voters search for the candidate’s number on a separate punch card grid while others place the 
pre-scored hole next to the candidate name. Optical scan technology requires that voters fill in an 
oval or other marking to the left or right of each candidate’s name. Finally, touch screen 
technology requires that voters touch a box on the computer screen in order to select their desired 
candidate. After selection, the screen asks the voter to confirm her choice. Technology is 
determined at the county level. Approximately 40 percent of all counties use punch card, 40 
percent use optical scan and 20 percent use touch screen technology. Each technology platform 
has several technology brands. The distribution of each brand is presented in Appendix 2. 
                                                 
6 Results do not change significantly if (a) Peter Camejo is dropped from the dataset, (b) all observations 
representing minor candidates earning more than five percent of the voteshare in a precinct are dropped from the 
dataset, or (c) the definition of minor candidates is restricted to include only those candidates in the lower half of the 
voteshare distribution.   8
  We utilize copies of sample ballots mailed to voters for 150 county-district combinations 
to code which candidates had which type of advantaged position in each count-district.
7 We 
obtain precinct-level statements of vote and registration data from the Institute of Governmental 
Studies (IGS) at the University of California, Berkeley. The statement of vote data has precinct-
level vote tallies for every candidate.
8 The precinct-level registration dataset contains precinct-
level (not individual-specific) registration data such as voter party registration, race, and age 
group. Because registration data does not include other important demographic variables such as 
income and education, we merge precinct-level data with U.S. Census data from 2000 at the 
blockgroup level using conversion files available from IGS. Summary statistics of these 
demographic variables are available in Appendix 2. 
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
In general, it is difficult to measure the level of adjacency misvotes because misvotes are 
recorded as valid votes. This may be the reason why previous literature (e.g., Alvarez et al. 2001 
and Brady et al. 2001) has predominantly focused on the residual vote – votes that are discarded 
because of hanging chads or other mismarkings. To our knowledge, Dee’s (2006) innovative 
paper is the only paper that analyzes adjacency misvotes directly. Dee argues that the positive 
correlation between the voteshares of a major candidate and the voteshares of “bookend 
candidates” – minor candidates listed immediately before or after the major candidate – is 
evidence of voting mistakes. Dee shows that voteshares of bookends increase by roughly 1/1000 
                                                 
7 The actual ballots used during Election Day are identical in layout to the sample ballots. In the case of touch screen 
technology, voters viewed electronic screens which displayed candidate names in the same layout as that presented 
on the sample paper ballots. We have been unable to collect sample ballots from Stanislaus and Imperial Counties 
(which account for 1.4% of the vote). 
8 Precinct-level data from IGS is at present incomplete. Full statement of vote and registration data along with 
matching files account for 84% of all votes cast in the Recall Election.   9
of a percentage point for every percentage point increase in the adjacent major candidate’s 
voteshare. However, Dee restricts his analysis to candidates who are almost always adjacent to 
major candidates and therefore cannot test voteshare gains caused by variation in when a minor 
candidate is adjacent to a major candidate. Thus, the critical assumption behind his results is that 
the voteshares of the four bookends are not correlated with the voteshares of major candidates 
due to reasons other than misvotes.  However, this assumption may be reasonable in the context 
of Dee’s paper, which focuses on which technologies mitigate misvoting rather than which 
demographic groups are most prone to misvoting and how misvotes can affect elections.   
Consistent with our findings, he finds that punch card technologies lead to significantly higher 
levels of misvoting. 
To better capture variation in adjacency, we define an adjacent candidate as any minor 
candidate that vertically or horizontally borders a major candidate on a particular ballot (see 
sample ballots in Appendix 1). We call these adjacent candidates north, south, east, and west 
adjacent following a standard compass diagram. For example, the candidate directly above a 
major candidate is north adjacent. Identification of adjacency misvoting results from random 
variation in when a minor candidate is an adjacent candidate. North and south adjacent 
candidates are identified due to candidate name rotation through page and column breaks. 
Because north and south adjacent candidates are located in the same column as the major 
candidate, they are always present and the same unless column and page breaks cause the major 
candidate to be listed at the top or bottom of a column. For example, minor candidates Burton 
and Bly-Chester are listed before and after major candidate Bustamante according to the 
candidate name list. They are always north and south adjacent unless they are separated from 
Bustamante by a page or column break.    10
Identification of east and west adjacent candidates occurs because column length varies 
by county. In the sixty percent of counties that use multi-column ballots, the candidates 
horizontally adjacent to the major candidates depend on the county’s column length. For 
example, if Schwarzenegger is listed in the middle column on a three-column ballot, he has east 
and west adjacent candidates. If Schwarzenegger is listed in the left-most column on a two-
column ballot, he only has an east adjacent candidate. Further, this east adjacent candidate may 
not be the same east adjacent candidate as in the previous ballot if the two ballots have columns 
of differing lengths. Statistics describing the identification of each type of adjacent candidate are 
available in Appendix 2.
9 
Combining district-level candidate name rotation and county-level variation in ballot 
layout, we identify 68 minor candidates that are adjacent to a major candidate in some but not all 
county-districts.  We use this variation to answer the following four questions: 
1.  Is there evidence of voter irrationality as measured by increased voteshares of minor 
candidates located in favorable positions? 
2.  How does misvoting affect the relative voteshares of major candidates? 
3.  What demographic characteristics correlate with the amount of misvoting? 
4.  What voting technologies correspond to a reduction in the level of misvotes? 
To examine adjacency misvoting, we use the following baseline specification: 
( I )  Votesharepdc = β0 + β1×Adjacentpdcm + controls + εpdc ,  
where 
Adjacentpdcm ≡ Idc
adjacent × Major Candidate Votesharepdcm  
                                                 
9 We also identify a special class of adjacent candidates with numbers located in squares adjacent to the number 
corresponding to the major candidate on a punch card (See Appendix 1). These punch card adjacent candidates only 
exist in the 19% of counties that use the Votomatic or Pollstar brands of voting machines. Because column length in 
the punch card grid differs from column length in the ballot text, a candidate can be punch card adjacent without 
being adjacent on the regular ballot and vice versa.   11
An observation is a minor candidate c in a precinct p, with voting technology and ballot layout 
varying by county-district d. Each observation is weighted by the number of votes cast in 
precinct p.
10 Votesharepdc is defined as the share of votes candidate c receives in precinct p in 
county-district d. We do not use the log of voteshare as the dependent variable because the 
voteshare gained by an adjacent candidate should be a level effect, and should not depend on the 
average voteshare of the minor candidate.
11  Idc
adjacent
  is a dummy variable equaling one if 
candidate c is adjacent to a major candidate in county-district d. In modifications of the baseline 
regression,  Idc
adjacent
  may represent specific types of candidate adjacency (e.g., the minor 
candidate listed directly above major candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger) or a vector representing 
several types of candidate adjacency. If minor candidate c is adjacent to a major candidate in 
precinct  p in county-district d, then Major Candidate Votesharepdcm equals the voteshare in 
precinct p of the major candidate m to whom the minor candidate is adjacent. Adjacentpdcm is 
defined as the product of Idc
adjacent and Major Candidate Votesharepdcm. Finally εpdc is an error 
term that we allow to be clustered by county-district-candidate because the primary right hand 
side variable of interest, Idc
adjacent, is constant within a county-district for a given minor candidate. 
                                                 
10 Weights account for the fact that an observation representing a large precinct is more precise because it is an 
average taken from a larger sample of voters. Thus, larger precincts should be weighted more heavily in the 
regression. 
11 This is verified empirically by a regression of minor candidate voteshare on a dummy variable equaling one if the 
minor candidate is adjacent to a major candidate and an interaction term between the dummy variable and the 
precinct-level voteshare of the minor candidate. The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant and close to 
zero.   12
In the baseline specification, β1 represents the gain in voteshare experienced by an 
adjacent minor candidate when the corresponding major candidate’s voteshare increases by one. 
In other words, β1 measures the percentage of voters originally intending to vote for a major 
candidate that end up voting for each adjacent minor candidate. (The total percentage of voters 
that misvote is not β1 but rather the product of β1 and the average number of minor candidates 
adjacent to major candidates per ballot.) Implicit in this interpretation of β1 is that adjacency 
misvoting is a positive function of the popularity of the associated major candidate; i.e. if 
Schwarzenegger is more popular in precinct A than in precinct B and Schwarzenegger’s voters 
are equally likely to misvote in precincts A and B, then candidates adjacent to Schwarzenegger 
should gain more voteshare in precinct A than in precinct B. 
  Our sample consists of observations at the candidate-precinct level. There are 132 data 
points per precinct, one for each minor candidate. This results in a total of 1,817,904 
observations, covering 13,772 precincts corresponding to 80 districts and 55 counties. 
  We also introduce the following set of controls to the baseline regression and all 
extensions of the baseline regression: candidate ballot location controls (dummy variables for 
first and last on the ballot overall, ballot page, and ballot column), candidate fixed effects, 
candidate fixed effects interacted with demographic controls, and candidate fixed effects 
interacted with the voteshares of the major candidates.
12 Altogether, 2250 control variables are 
included in our baseline specification to ensure correct identification of adjacency misvoting. 
  The ballot location controls are county-district-candidate-level dummy variables that 
equal one if the minor candidate is located first or last overall, on a page, or in a column on the 
                                                 
12 The addition of county-district fixed effect does not significantly change baseline results. They are omitted from 
the analysis in order to reduce computational demands on statistical software. Because the dependent variables sum 
to the total voteshare of minor candidates, county-district fixed effects only control for the relative popularity of all 
minor candidates compared to major candidates in each county-district.   13
ballot. These ballot position controls ensure that adjacency misvotes are not incorrectly identified 
off of position misvotes. The candidate fixed effects control for differences in the popularity of 
minor candidates that could lead to bias if relatively popular minor candidates happen to be 
adjacent to major candidates on a disproportionate share of the ballots. We also control for 
candidate fixed effects interacted with precinct-level demographic characteristics. This controls 
for how precinct-level demographic characteristics influence the popularity of each minor 
candidate. It ensures that adjacency misvoting is not incorrectly identified from precinct 
demographic characteristics, which, by chance, might favor candidates that are adjacent in that 
precinct. Similarly we control for candidate fixed effects interacted with the precinct-level 
voteshare of each major candidate to control for the correlation between the popularity of each 
minor candidate and the popularity of the major candidates. 
  In the Results section, we introduce several modifications of the baseline specification to 
check the robustness of the baseline results. We also further explore adjacency misvoting as it 




1. The Baseline Result 
  Regression (1) in Table 2 shows the results of the baseline specification. It is a least 
squares regression of precinct-level voteshares of each minor candidate on Adjacent, a variable 
equal to the voteshare of the associated major candidate if the minor candidate is adjacent to a 
major candidate and zero otherwise. Because voteshares of major candidates are expressed as 
fractions and voteshares of minor candidates as percentages, the coefficient on Adjacent   14
represents the percentage of voters that misvote for each minor candidate adjacent to their 
preferred major candidate. Regression (1) reveals that each minor candidate adjacent to a major 
candidate will experience an increase in votes equal to 0.104% of the intended votes for that 
major candidate. This result is significant at the one percent level and is clear evidence of the 
bounded rationality of some voters. 
Regression (2) in Table 2 decomposes adjacency misvoting by major candidate. It shows 
a regression of minor candidate voteshare on the interaction between Adjacent and a vector of 
dummy variables representing each major candidate. It shows that Bustamante loses 0.143% of 
his vote to each of his adjacent minor candidates, but that the corresponding figure is only 
0.088% for Schwarzenegger and 0.107% for McClintock.  This result is striking because it 
implies that Bustamante voters are 63% more likely to misvote than are Schwarzenegger voters. 
Thus, if Bustamante had received as high a voteshare as Schwarzenegger, Bustamante’s adjacent 
candidates would have gained 63% more misvotes relative to Schwarzenegger’s adjacent 
candidates.  This result has important consequences because voteshare gained by an adjacent 
candidate is voteshare lost by the associated major candidate. In later regressions, we present 
evidence that Bustamante lost more votes than the other major candidates because he attracted 
voters from demographic groups associated with high levels of misvoting. 
Regression (3) in Table 1 shows a variation of the baseline regression in which minor 
candidate voteshare is regressed on Adjacent Dummy, a dummy variable equaling one if a 
candidate is adjacent to a major candidate. The coefficient on Adjacent Dummy represents the 
average gain in voteshare a minor candidate experiences when she is adjacent to a major 
candidate. Results show that minor candidates gain 0.037 percentage points in voteshare if they 
are adjacent to a major candidate. Given that the average voteshare of minor candidates is 0.05%   15
percent, being adjacent to a major candidate nearly doubles a minor candidate’s voteshare. A 
calculation taking into account the magnitude of adjacency misvoting for each type of adjacency 
(i.e. north, south, east, and west), along with the average number of adjacent candidates per 
ballot (see Appendix 3), reveals that misvotes accounted for at least 0.25% (SE=0.03%) of all 
votes cast in the Recall Election. Further, if Schwarzenegger and Bustamante had received equal 
shares of the votes received by the major candidates, misvotes would have given 
Schwarzenegger an edge of 0.06%. 
Table 3 presents a series of regressions that support the robustness of our primary 
findings. Regression (1) in Table 3 shows a regression of minor candidate voteshare on Adjacent 
Dummy, a dummy variable equaling one if a minor candidate is adjacent to one of the major 
candidates and Adjacent, equal to the product of Adjacent Dummy and the precinct-level 
voteshare of an adjacent candidate’s associated major candidate. Regression (1) tests our 
assumption that adjacent candidates gain voteshare as a positive function of the popularity of the 
major candidate. Results suggest that our assumption is valid – adjacent candidates earn only 
0.010 percentage points in voteshare (a result that is not significantly different from zero at the 
10% level) if they are adjacent to a major candidate that earns zero voteshare in a precinct. 
Further, adjacent candidates gain an additional 0.00082 percentage points for each additional 
percentage point gained by a major candidate. This result is significant at the 1% level. 
Regression (2) in Table 3 tests that our primary results are driven by variation in when a 
candidate is adjacent to a major candidate rather than by variation in the voteshares of associated 
major candidates. Instead of regressing minor candidate voteshare on the product of an adjacency 
dummy and the precinct-level voteshares of associated major candidates, Regression (2) uses the 
product of an adjacency dummy and the statewide voteshares of the associated major candidates   16
as the independent variable. By substituting statewide major candidate voteshare for precinct-
level voteshare, we retain our assumption that adjacent candidates should gain more votes when 
they border more popular major candidates. However, now the only variation in the independent 
variable is caused by the adjacency of minor candidates to major candidates. The coefficient on 
Adjacent Dummy×CA Voteshare is 0.112 and significant at the 1% level. More importantly, it is 
very similar in magnitude to the coefficient of 0.104 on Adjacent in Regression (1) of Table 1, 
confirming that our results are driven by variation in the adjacency status of minor candidates. 
Regression (3) in Table 3 decomposes adjacency misvoting by type of adjacency. We 
define a minor candidate to be adjacent if she borders a major candidate to the north, south, east 
or west. This regression shows that misvoting is strongest when a minor candidate is east 
adjacent and weakest when a minor candidate is west adjacent; 0.143% of voters misvote for east 
adjacent candidates, only 0.038% of voters misvote for west adjacent candidates, while 0.082% 
and 0.111% of voters misvote for north and south adjacent candidates respectively. We explore 
why east adjacent candidates gain more in voteshare than west adjacent candidates in our 
discussion of Regression (6). For now, we note that Regression (3) shows that adjacency 
misvoting is not driven merely by name confusion. One might think that voters vote for north 
and south adjacent candidates because candidates are listed in order (according to a randomized 
alphabet) down a column. For example, on the majority of ballots, the south adjacent candidate 
for Arnold Schwarzenegger is George Schwartzman. Voters may mistakenly vote for 
Schwartzman because his last name somewhat resembles “Schwarzenegger.” We use candidate 
fixed effects to control for the direct effect of name confusion, but one might believe that it is the 
interaction between name confusion and adjacency that drives adjacency misvotes. However, 
east and west adjacent candidates are one column off from a major candidate and therefore have   17
last names that are dissimilar to the names of their associated major candidates. The fact that 
these adjacent candidates also gain voteshare of comparable magnitude suggests that it is 
adjacency rather than name confusion that drives adjacency misvotes. 
Regression (4) in Table 3 explores the voteshare gained by candidates that are diagonally 
adjacent to major candidates. Diagonally adjacent candidates are one row and one column off 
from their associated major candidate. Regression (4) shows that diagonally adjacent candidates 
earn much less in voteshare than candidates that are horizontally or vertically adjacent. 0.002% 
of voters misvote for each diagonally adjacent candidate compared to the 0.104% of voters that 
misvote for each vertically or horizontally adjacent candidate. Further, the coefficient on 
Diagonally Adjacent is not significant at the 10% level. Low voteshare gains for diagonally 
adjacent candidates likely occur because voters are less likely to misvote for candidates one row 
and one column removed from their intended choices. Because diagonally adjacent candidates 
gain very little in voteshare, we restrict our analysis to vertically or horizontally adjacent 
candidates. 
Regressions (5) and (6) offer insight into what causes misvotes. We find that misvotes are 
primarily caused by accidental mistakes rather than the increased consideration voters may give 
to candidates adjacent to their preferred major candidates. Regression (5) in Table 3 explores 
misvoting for candidates adjacent to major candidates on punch cards. Nineteen percent of 
counties in California used punch card voting machines that require each voter to search for her 
desired candidate and that candidate’s associated number from a booklet of candidate names. 
Each voter then punched out the desired candidate’s number on a separate punch card. A sample 
punch card is provided in Appendix 1. Because the length of columns on the punch card differs 
from column length in the text ballot, a minor candidate can be punch card adjacent without   18
being adjacent on a regular ballot and vice versa. The punch card lists only numbers, so 
voteshare gained by punch card adjacent candidates should represent gains due to voting 
mistakes. Voters are unlikely to first locate a preferred major candidate and then to give 
increased consideration to numbers adjacent to the major candidate’s number if they do not see 
any names associated with those numbers. Regression (5) shows that, controlling for the 
adjacency of minor candidates on the regular ballot, 0.030% of voters misvote for each punch 
card adjacent candidate. This result is only significant at the ten percent level, perhaps because 
our limited observations involving punch card adjacency do not have enough power to yield 
significant results. Nevertheless, this result supports our hypothesis that adjacency misvotes do 
not derive only from increased consideration of adjacent candidates.  
Regression (6) in Table 3 presents additional evidence that adjacency misvotes are driven 
by accidental votes rather than by increased consideration of adjacent candidates. We regress 
minor candidate voteshare on Adjacent and Adjacent×Confusing Side.  Confusing Side is a 
dummy variable equaling one if the minor candidate is horizontally adjacent to a major candidate 
and listed in the column with selection boxes closest to the name of the major candidate. For 
example, in a single row, we might read from left to right: bubble, minor candidate, bubble, 
major candidate, bubble, minor candidate. See the figures in Appendix 1 for examples. In this 
case, the bubble for the east adjacent candidate is very close to the name of the major candidate 
and a voter may accidentally fill in the east adjacent candidate’s bubble believing that she has 
cast a vote for the major candidate. Thus, confusing side equals one if a horizontally adjacent 
candidate is listed in a position that may be most confusing to the voter. After controlling for the 
effects of north and south adjacency, we find that the coefficient on Horizontally Adjacent is 
0.031 while the coefficient on Horizontally Adjacent×Confusing side is 0.123. This implies that   19
0.031% of voters misvote for each horizontally adjacent candidates not on the confusing side 
while 0.031%+0.123%=0.154% of voters misvote for each horizontally adjacent candidate on 
the confusing side. Thus, voters are five times more likely to misvote for candidates listed on the 
confusing side. This implies that adjacency misvotes are, in large part, driven by accidental 
voting mistakes, because increased consideration should not depend on how each candidate’s 
bubble is located relative to the major candidates. Regression (6) may also explain why the 
coefficient on East Adjacent is stronger than the coefficient on West Adjacent in Regression (3). 
For 63% of the multi-column ballots used in the Recall Election, selection boxes were placed to 
the left of each candidate’s name. Therefore, the selection boxes of east adjacent candidates were 
usually closest to the names of the major candidates. 
  Regression (6) also delivers clear policy implications. Adjacency misvoting is extremely 
high in cases when it is ambiguous which selection boxes correspond to each candidate’s name. 
Therefore, adjacency misvoting may be reduced if columns and rows are spaced farther apart, so 
that there is a clear separation between the each candidate’s selection box and all other selection 
boxes. 
2. Demographic Characteristics 
  The cognitive costs of voting, given complex ballot designs and voting technology, may 
be higher among certain demographic groups than others. This leads to systematic disadvantages 
for major candidates that attract groups more likely to misvote. Below, we show how the amount 
of misvoting varies with precinct-level demographic characteristics. We find that voters from 
precincts with high misvote rates disproportionally favored Democratic candidate Cruz 
Bustamante and that voter demographics may explain why Bustamante lost a higher proportion 
of his votes to adjacent candidates than did Schwarzenegger or McClintock.   20
A growing literature suggests that the level of residual votes, i.e. votes that are discarded 
because voters vote for more than one candidate, leave hanging chads, etc., depends on the racial 
and socioeconomic composition of each precinct. Tomz and Van Houweling (2003) use precinct-
level data from South Carolina and Louisiana’s 2000 Presidential Election to find that in areas 
with punch card or optically scanned ballots, the Black-White gap in residual voteshare ranged 
from four to six percentage points. In comparison, lever and touch screen machines cut the gap in 
residual voteshares by a factor of ten. Tomz and Van Houweling do not control for income, 
education, and other demographic variables in their analysis. However, even controlling for 
socioeconomic differences, the racial gap remains significant. Knack and Kropf (2003) use 
county-level data from the 1996 Presidential Election to find that counties with more Black or 
Hispanic voters have higher residual vote tallies, controlling for income, education and voting 
technology. 
To our knowledge, no research has yet explored how the prevalence of misvoting varies 
by demographic characteristics. To test how misvoting varies by precinct-level demographic 
characteristics, we interact the variable Adjacent with precinct-level demographic characteristics 
Demopd, and add this interaction to the baseline specification.
13 If Demopd represents a single 
variable, then the coefficient on Adjacent×Demopd represents the additional gain in voteshare 
caused by adjacency misvoting when Demopd and all other demographic variables positively 
correlated with Demopd increases. Meanwhile, if Demopd represents a vector of demographic 
characteristics, the coefficients on Adjacent×Demopd represent the marginal change in the gain in 
voteshare caused by adjacency misvotes for an increase in each demographic variable, holding 
the other measured demographic variables constant. This distinction is important in cases in 
                                                 
13 The direct effect of Demopd is absorbed by the Demopd×candidate fixed effects interactions that are already 
included in the baseline specification.   21
which the partial effect differs from the overall change. For example, we find that adjacency 
misvoting is stronger in precincts with many registered Democrats. However, this overall effect 
is driven by the fact that many registered Democrats have other characteristics (such as less 
education) that may cause them to make more voting mistakes. If we hold these characteristics 
constant, we find that the partial effect of a greater percentage of registered Democrats does not 
increase misvoting. 
  When exploring the impact of demographic characteristics on adjacency misvoting, we 
use the same set of controls as in baseline specification.  In addition, we control for Demopd, 
Techd and Adjacent×Techd where Techd is a vector of technology dummy variables representing 
the brand of technology used in each county-district. The controls for technology ensure that our 
demographic estimates are not biased because of a possible correlation between precinct-level 
demographic characteristics and the voting technology of the precinct’s corresponding county. 
There are two caveats to the demographic results. First, even if a demographic 
characteristic such as low education is correlated with higher levels of misvoting, lack of 
education may not be the cause of adjacency misvotes. For example, it is conceivable that 
education is positively correlated with experience taking standardized exams, and experience 
with standardized exams is what truly reduces levels of misvoting. Second, the ecological 
fallacy, as explained by Achen and Shively (1995), states that analysis using precinct-level data 
does not necessarily imply direct links between individual demographics characteristics and the 
magnitude of adjacency misvoting. For example, a regression might show that a precinct with a 
60% Asian and 40% White population casts misvotes at a higher rate than does a precinct with a 
10% Asian population and a 90% White population. This does not necessarily imply that Asian 
voters are more likely to cast misvotes. It could instead be the case that the White voters who   22
choose to live in predominantly Asian precincts cast misvotes at a higher rate. Nevertheless, we 
argue that precinct-level demographic data offers important insights. Precinct-level demographic 
data reveal which types of precincts exhibit stronger adjacency misvoting. 
  Regression (1) in Table 4 shows that a one percentage point increase in the number of 
voters with a high school degree corresponds to a 0.0062 percentage point fall in the percentage 
of voters that misvote for each adjacent candidate. This result is significant at the five percent 
level. The coefficient on Adjacent×%College Graduates is similar with value of -0.0056, 
suggesting that, holding high school education constant, college education has no additional 
impact on misvoting. Thus, precincts with high percentages of high school graduates (including 
college graduates) cast significantly fewer misvotes. The calculations in the last three columns of 
Table 4 show the difference in the percentage of voters that vote for each adjacent candidate for 
precincts at the 5
th percentile of a demographic variable compared to precincts at the 95
th 
percentile. Holding the fraction with a college education constant, the percentage of voters that 
misvote for each adjacent candidate is 0.22 percentage points lower in precincts at the 95
th 
percentile of high school education than in precincts at the 5
th percentile. This difference is 
double the average percentage of voters that misvote for each adjacent candidate.  This result is 
consistent with evidence from Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) and Benjamin et al. (2006). Lusardi 
and Mitchell also find that lack of education is a strong predictor of making mistakes, but in the 
context of simple questions about interest, inflation and risk diversification.  Benjamin et al. 
present experimental evidence that lower cognitive ability, rather than lack of schooling per se, is 
a powerful predictor of behavioral anomalies. 
  Regression (2) in table 4 shows that, holding the percentage of precinct residents that are 
Black and Asian constant, a one percentage point increase in the number of Hispanic residents   23
corresponds to a 0.0038 percentage point increase in the percentage of voters that misvote for 
each adjacent candidate. This result is significant at the one percent level. Meanwhile, the 
coefficients on Adjacent×%Black and Adjacent×%Asian are small with standard errors near 
zero, implying that precincts with high percentages of Black or Asian residents do not behave 
significantly differently from precincts with high percentages of White residents (the omitted 
category). Holding the percentage of Black and Asian residents constant, the percentage of 
voters that misvote for each adjacent candidate is 0.23 percentage points higher in precincts at 
the 95
th percentile of percent Hispanic than in precincts at the 5
th percentile. This difference is 
also double the average percentage of voters that misvote for each adjacent candidate. 
  Regression (3) in table 4 shows how misvoting varies by the party registration of voters. 
The coefficients on Adjacent×%Republican  and  Adjacent×%Independent are -0.0025 and -
0.0068, respectively, while the coefficient on Adjacent×%Other Party is not significantly 
different from zero. Since the omitted category is %Democrat, these results show that precincts 
with high percentages of Republican or Independent voters misvote at significantly lower rates 
than precincts with high percentages of Democratic or Other Party voters. A one percentage 
point increase in the number of registered Republicans corresponds to a 0.0025% point fall in the 
percentage of voters that misvote for each adjacent candidate. Holding the percentage of 
Independent and Other Party voters constant, the percentage of voters that misvote for each 
adjacent candidate is 0.128 percentage points lower in precincts at the 95
th percentile of percent 
Republican than in precincts at the 5
th percentile. Similarly, holding the percentage of 
Republican and Other Party constant, the percentage of voters that misvote for each adjacent 
candidate is 0.170 percentage points lower in precincts at the 95
th percentile of percent   24
Independent than in precincts at the 5
th percentile. These differences are greater than the average 
percentage of voters that misvote for each adjacent candidate. 
  Table 5 presents regressions exploring how adjacency misvotes vary with five other 
precinct-level demographic variables: median household income in thousands of U.S. dollars, 
percent living below the Census poverty line, percent lacking English fluency, percent over the 
age of 65, and percent between the ages of 18 and 24. All specifications show a significant 
coefficient on the interaction term, Adjacent×X where X represents the demographic 
characteristic of interest. These coefficients imply that precincts with high percentages of 
residents between the ages of 18 and 24, living below the poverty line, or lacking fluency in 
English
14 exhibit higher levels of misvoting. Precincts with high percentages of residents above 
the age of 65 also exhibit higher levels of misvoting, although the effect is smaller than for the 
other characteristics.
15 Conversely, precincts with high median household income exhibit low 
levels of misvoting. Calculations in the last three rows of Table 5 estimate the difference in the 
magnitude of adjacency misvoting between precincts at the 5
th and 95
th percentile in terms of X, 
the demographic variable of interest.  These calculations reveal that differences in these 
demographic characteristics correspond to large changes in the magnitude of adjacency 
misvoting.  The results for low income precincts are consistent with Madrian and Shea (2001), 
Choi et al. (2004), and Thaler and Benartzi (2004), who in different settings, find that lower-
                                                 
14 We also test how the relationship between the percentage of voters lacking English fluency and adjacency 
misvoting changes conditional on the availability of foreign language ballots. During the Recall Election, 80% of 
precincts offered Spanish ballots while 40% of precincts offered ballots in at least one Asian language. Results show 
that adjacency misvoting is stronger in precincts that offer Spanish ballots. In addition, the availability of foreign 
language ballots does not significantly change the relationship between English fluency and adjacency misvotes. 
However, it is difficult to draw causal conclusions from these results because the availability of foreign language 
ballots is endogenously determined by each county. 
15 Age 65 was chosen as the cutoff because voter registration data does not distinguish age groups for ages greater 
than 65. Voter registration data may provide a better estimate of actual voter demographics than Census data 
because a higher percentage of registered voters vote on Election Day. However, results do not significantly change 
using older age cutoffs derived from Census data.   25
income employees are more likely to conform to the default savings options by their employers, 
which is likely because these employees have a higher cognition cost of making the optimal 
savings decisions. 
  Table 6 shows the results of a regression of minor candidate voteshare on Adjacent and 
the interaction between Adjacent and a vector of precinct-level demographics. The coefficients 
on the interaction terms are partial effects; they represent the change in the magnitude of 
adjacency misvoting for a change in a single demographic characteristic when the other 
demographic characteristics are held constant.  We find that the partial effect of the percentage of 
registered Democrats is not significantly different from the partial effects of other political 
affiliations.
16 Altogether, the demographic interactions show that misvoting increases with the 
fraction Hispanic or Asian, the fraction elderly and the fraction in poverty, while it decreases 
with the fraction with at least a high school degree, and the fraction lacking English fluency.
17 
These demographic trends shed light on why, relative to Schwarzenegger and 
McClintock, Bustamante lost more votes to adjacent candidates. If the three candidates had been 
equally popular, Bustamante would have lost 63% more votes than Schwarzenegger and 34% 
more votes than McClintock. Using demographic trends, we estimate how much of the 
difference in voteshare lost by each major candidate can be accounted for by differences in the 
demographic characteristics of each major candidate’s voting base.
18 We find that, compared to 
                                                 
16 The percentage of voters registered with the Democratic Party is negatively correlated with median household 
income and the percentage of residents with high school diplomas, both of which are associated with lower levels of 
misvoting.  This explains why the percentage of registered democratic voters has a positive overall effect on 
misvoting (Table 4) but a non-significant partial effect (Table 6). 
17 The percentage of voters lacking English fluency is negatively correlated with income and education. Further, 
over 80% of voters had access to foreign language ballots. This may explain why the percentage of voters lacking 
English fluency has a positive overall effect on misvoting (Table 5) but a negative partial effect (Table 6). 
18 We first estimate the number of misvotes cast in each precinct using each precinct’s demographic characteristics. 
The estimated number of misvotes in each precinct multiplied by each major candidate’s performance in a precinct 
(as a fraction of the total votes for the three major candidates) is an estimate of the number of misvotes lost by each 
major candidate. After adjusting for the relative popularities of the major candidates, we find that demographic   26
Schwarzenegger and McClintock, Bustamante attracted voters most likely to misvote. 
Differences in the observed demographic characteristics of each major candidate’s voting base 
can explain roughly one half of the difference in voteshare lost. Our calculation is actually a 
lower bound for the explanatory power of demographic characteristics. Since our data is at the 
precinct level, we need to assume that, within a precinct, Schwarzenegger, Bustamante, and 
McClintock voters are equally likely to misvote for adjacent candidates. This is likely to be false 
– within a precinct, Bustamante voters are probably more likely to cast misvotes. Therefore, we 
underestimate the extent to which demographic characteristics can account for differences in 
voteshares lost by the major candidates. 
 
3. Voting Technology 
Numerous studies and policy initiatives have explored the effect of voting technology on 
the number of discarded ballots, also known as residual votes. These studies consistently find 
that, relative to optical scan and electronic technology platforms, the punch card technology 
platform is associated with the greatest number of residual votes. Brady et al. (2001) summarizes 
the current research relating to voting technology. On average, residual votes account for two 
percent of all votes in presidential races. Using county-level data from the 2000 U.S. Presidential 
Election, Brady et al. find that touch screen and optical scan voting technology yield half the 
level of residual votes found in elections using punch card technology. Alvarez et al. (2001) 
employ similar methods to find results generally consistent with those of Brady et al. 
                                                                                                                                                             
characteristics predict that Bustamante lost 24% more votes than Schwarzenegger and 19% more votes than 
McClintock. Thus demographic characteristics can account for at least 39% of the difference in votes lost by 
Bustamante and Schwarzenegger and 57% of the difference in votes lost by Bustamante and McClintock.    27
While numerous studies have explored the relationship between technology and the 
residual vote, much less research has explored the relationship between technology and 
adjacency misvotes. Dee (2006) finds that punch card technology increases the voteshare gained 
by “bookend” candidates, i.e. candidates vertically adjacent to major candidates. Using county-
level data from the 2003 California Recall election, Dee shows that, relative to touch screen and 
optical scan technology, punch card technology increases the voteshare of bookends by 0.04 
percentage points on average, an increase of more than one-third of the mean voteshare of the 
bookends. We extend Dee’s analysis to a precinct-level dataset that measures adjacency misvotes 
based upon variation in when candidates are vertically and horizontally adjacent to major 
candidates. We also extend Dee’s analysis by exploring whether technology differences are 
driven by platforms (i.e. punch card) or by individual technology brands. Further, we control for 
precinct-level demographic characteristics – this will better control for the possibility that 
technology is correlated with demographic characteristics that influence misvoting. 
To study the relationship between technology and adjacency misvoting, we interact the 
variable Adjacent with a vector of technology dummies Techd representing technology platforms 
or technology brands. We add this interaction and Techd itself to the baseline specification. By 
platform of technology, we refer to broad categories of technology such as touch screen, punch 
card, or optical scan technology. By brands of technology, we refer to specific brands of voting 
machines, e.g., the Diebold AccuVote-TS that uses the touch screen technology platform. For a 
summary of the availability of each type of technology, see Appendix 1. In addition to the large 
set of controls included in the baseline regression, we now add controls for Adjacent×Demopd, 
where Demopd is a vector of precinct-level demographic variables. This specification controls for   28
the possibility that voting technology is correlated with precinct-level demographic variables and 
separates technology effects from demographic effects. 
  Regression (2) in Table 7 shows the relationship between voting technology platform and 
adjacency misvoting. Our results indicate that 0.197% of voters using punch card technology 
misvote for each adjacent candidate compared to only 0.100% and 0.065% of voters using 
optical scan and touch screen technology respectively. Further, the coefficient on 
Adjacent×Punch Card is significantly different from the coefficients on Adjacent×Optical Scan 
and Adjacent×Touch Screen at the five percent level. These results suggest that touch screen and 
optical scan technology cut the prevalence of misvoting roughly in half relative to punch card 
technology. This result is consistent with the large literature (e.g., Alvarez et al. 2001 and Brady 
et al. 2001) arguing that punch card technology causes the greatest number of residual votes. 
After all, residual votes are examples of detected voting mistakes while adjacency misvotes are 
largely undetected voting mistakes. 
  Regression (4) in Table 7 shows the relationship between the brand of voting technology 
and the magnitude of adjacency misvoting. Eleven brands of voting technology were used during 
the Recall Election. Each brand corresponded to one of three technology platforms: optical scan, 
touch screen, or punch card. Further details concerning the distribution of technology brands are 
included in Appendix 1. Results from Regression (2) reveal that, controlling for the impact of 
demographic characteristics, brands tend to have the same rate of misvoting within each 
technology class, with three notable exceptions: the optical scan Diebold Accu-Vote-OS has a 
level of misvoting that is comparable to typical punch card voting technologies, the punch card 
Datavote brand has a level of misvoting that is comparable to most optical scan and touch screen   29
technologies,
19 and the touch screen Diebold AccuVote-TS is associated with an insignificantly 
low level of misvoting. 
Results from regressions (2) and (4) are very similar to results from regression (1) and (3) 
in which we do not control for precinct demographic characteristics. This supports evidence by 
Knack and Kropf (2002), Garner and Spalaore (2005), and Card and Moretti (2005) showing that 
areas with low levels of education and income, and high levels of Black or Hispanic voters are 
not more likely to have “inferior” technologies such as punch card voting. Of course, it is 
possible that precincts in counties that choose to adopt each brand of voting technology have 
other characteristics not already accounted for by the demographic controls that influence the 
magnitude of adjacency misvoting. We cannot simply conclude that touch screen technology is 
“better” than punch card technology because technology may be endogenously chosen. 
However, the technology brand analysis does suggest that a simple switch away from the punch 
card technology platform may not automatically reduce the level adjacency misvoting. Careful 
consideration of inter-brand differences may be necessary. 
 
4. Applications and Extensions 
While the small but significant loss of votes to adjacent candidates did not change the 
outcome of the Recall Election, it may have important implications for elections in general. 
Numerous presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections have been determined by very 
slim margins of victory. The margins of victory of the popular vote in the Presidential Elections 
                                                 
19 The Datavote punch card brand distinguishes itself from the other two punch card brands in that it allows voters to 
punch out their selections on the regular ballots (rather than requiring the use of punch card ballots in addition to 
regular text ballots). Thus, the low level of misvotes associated with the Datavote machine suggests that the act of 
“punching” out pre-scored holes may not be the cause of misvoting. Instead, higher levels of misvoting associated 
with punch card technology by may be driven by the use of separate punch card ballots.   30
of 1880, 1884, 1960, and 2000 were all less than one-quarter of a percent.
20 Recently, the 2004 
Washington gubernatorial, 2000 Washington senatorial, 1998 Nevada senatorial, and 2002 South 
Dakota senatorial elections were determined by voteshare margins of less than one-tenth of a 
percent.  Major candidates that attract voters that are more likely to cast misvotes would suffer 
key disadvantages in these close elections. 
  However, one may wonder if results from California’s gubernatorial recall election can 
be applied to other major elections. The Recall Election was unique in that it featured an 
unusually large number of candidates, 135 in total, competing in a single race. The advantage is 
that the large number of candidates combined with variation in ballot layout and candidate order 
provides the best available identification of adjacency misvoting. The disadvantage is that most 
major elections feature far fewer candidates competing in a single race. For example, while a 
total of 72 candidates ran for President in at least one state during the 2004 Election, the majority 
of states listed fewer than ten candidates. Even primary elections, known for their large candidate 
pools, typically feature fewer than thirty candidates per race.
21 This does not imply, however, 
that the California Recall Election ballots were unusually confusing. Ballots used in major 
elections contain numerous races (e.g., President, Senate, House, assembly district, county, 
municipality, etc.) and propositions, and thus do not significantly differ in length or complexity 
from Recall Election ballots. However, adjacency misvoting may depend on the length of the 
candidate list for a single race. Therefore, future research may wish to explore whether misvoting 
occurs at comparable levels in elections featuring fewer candidates. 
                                                 
20 Outcomes of presidential elections are officially determined by the Electoral College. For a majority of U.S. 
states, the popular vote by state determines how state electoral votes are distributed in the Electoral College. In each 
of the presidential elections listed above, the margin of victory was less than a quarter of a percent in the popular 
vote of at least one state with enough electoral votes to determine the outcome of the election. 
21 Data for presidential elections and primaries are drawn from state election websites.   31
  Future nationwide studies of adjacency misvoting may be particularly beneficial because 
adjacency misvoting could have a large impact on major elections outside of California. Unlike 
California, many states in the U.S. do not rotate candidate name order on ballots. Rather, 
incumbents are listed first, followed by a long list of minor candidates. This implies that the 
candidate adjacent to a major candidate could be another major candidate. If this is the case, 
votes lost by one major candidate are systematically accrued by another major candidate. For 
example, suppose that, relative to the Republican frontrunner, the Democratic frontrunner 
attracts voters that are more likely to cast misvotes. Further suppose that the two frontrunners are 
adjacent to each other on the ballot. Then the Democratic frontrunner would not only lose more 




This paper tests the hypothesis that minor candidates experience gains in voteshare when 
their names are listed near the name of a major candidate on a ballot. We refer to votes for minor 
candidates resulting from adjacency misvoting as “misvotes” because ballot layout should not 
impact the voting choices of fully rational voters with negligible cognition costs.  
  We test adjacency misvoting using a unique dataset combining precinct-level voting 
results from the 2003 California Recall Election with precinct-level Census and voter registration 
data. Because ballot layout and candidate order are determined at the county-district level, there 
exists random variation in when a minor candidate is adjacent to a major candidate. The gain in 
the total voteshares experienced by minor candidates that are adjacent is an estimate of the 
number of misvotes. We find that the voteshares of minor candidates almost double when their   32
names are adjacent to the names of major candidates and that misvotes accounted for at least 
0.25% percent of all votes cast during the Recall Election. Misvotes are most prevalent in 
precincts with high percentages of Democratic, Hispanic, low-income, non-English speaking, 
poorly educated, or young voters, suggesting that these groups may face higher cognitive costs of 
voting. We also find that, relative to the punch card technology platform, the use of the optical 
scan or touch screen technology platforms generally corresponds to a reduction in the number of 
misvotes. However, even within technology platforms, there are some notable performance 
differences across voting machine brands. 
  Adjacency misvoting has important electoral implications because votes gained by 
adjacent candidates are votes lost by major candidates. A major candidate that attracts voters 
from precincts that cast high levels of misvotes suffers systematic electoral disadvantages. In the 
case of the California Recall Election, precincts that were most affected by adjacency misvoting 
also showed the strongest support for Democratic candidate Cruz Bustamante. This may explain 
why, relative to Republican candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger, Bustamante lost 63 percent more 
of the votes intended for him to his adjacent candidates. Although this difference in lost votes 
represents a small fraction of the total voteshare, the loss exceeds the margins of victory in 
several recent elections, including the presidential election of 2000 and the Washington 
gubernatorial election of 2004. Thus, adjacency misvoting is powerful enough to determine 
outcomes in important highly-contested close elections.   33
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The image above shows the upper portion of a multi-column optical scan ballot used in Alameda 
County. Consider major candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger, located in the middle column, third 
from the bottom. Because the columns are not clearly separated by boundary lines, voters 
intending to vote for Schwarzenegger may accidentally fill in the bubble corresponding to 
Ronald Palmieri, Schwarzenegger’s east adjacent candidate, instead of the correct bubble to the 
left of Schwarzenegger’s name. 
   36
 
The images above show a single-column ballot and a punch card grid used in Sacramento 
County. Voters searched for the number corresponding to the desired candidate’s name using 
standard text ballots. Each voter then used a stylus to punch out the desired candidate’s number 
on a separate punch card grid. The small print suggests voters may accidentally punch out 
numbers corresponding to candidates adjacent to major candidates on the punch card. 
   37
 
The image above shows a multi-column touch screen ballot used in Riverside County. Voters 
selected their desired candidates by touching the desired candidates’ corresponding circles. A 
second screen then asked voters to confirm their choices. This ballot also shows how column 
breaks allow identification of vertically adjacent candidates. Minor candidate George 
Schwartzman normally follows major candidate Arnold Schwarzenegger in the candidate list. 
However, Schwartzman is not south adjacent on this ballot because he is separated from 
Schwarzenegger by a column break. 
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Statement of Vote and Voter Registration Data
total votes cast in precinct 852 585
% voteshare of a minor candidate 0.05 0.35
% voteshare for Arnold Schwarzenegger 48.3 17.0
% voteshare for Cruz Bustamante 31.8 17.7
% voteshare for Tom McClintock 13.5 4.8
% registered with the Democratic Party 40.1 12.4
% registered with the Republican Party 38.6 15.1
% registered with other political parties 6.5 8.4
% not registered with any political party 15.0 6.0
% age 18 to 24 8.1 4.9
% age 65 plus 19.0 10.8
Census Demographic Data
% White 68.3 19.4
% Black 4.9 8.9
% Asian 10.5 11.5
% Hispanic 22.1 19.1
% lacking english fluency 7.7 8.5
median household income ($1000 per year) 28.0 14.1
% below the Census poverty line 11.0 10.6
% high school graduates (not incl. college graduates) 43.5 10.9






Observations are at the candidate-precinct-level. Observations do not include the top three voteshare earners. Means and standard 











north adjacent 93.7 96.8 94.1 3
south adjacent 92.1 96.0 92.6 3
east adjacent 35.6 39.0 35.5 25
west adjacent 23.4 26.5 15.6 19
punchcard adjacent 10.9 10.9 10.9 18
Identification of Adjacent Candidates
Frequency:
% of precincts with ballots that 
contain this type of adjacency number of minor 
candidates that occupy the 
adjacent position
When calculating frequency, observations are weighted by the total number of votes cast in each precinct. This is done because 
observations are weighted by precinct size in all regression specifications.   39 
 
Technology Brand Technology Platform Prevalence Used Again in 2005 Election
Diebold Accu-Vote-OS optical scan 12% Yes
ES&S 550 Optech optical scan 5% No
ES&S Optech Eagle optical scan 5% Yes
Hart Ballot Now optical scan 11% Yes
Mark-A-Vote optical scan 3% Yes
Sequoia Optech optical scan 6% Yes
Diebold AccuVote-TS touch screen 5% Yes
Sequoia Edge touch screen 6% Yes
Datavote punch card 6% Yes
Pollstar punch card 9% No
Votomatic punch card 31% No
Voting Technology
Prevalence is defined as the percentage of observations in which each brand of technology is used. When calculating prevalence, 
observations are weighted by the total number of votes cast in each precinct. Brands listed with a “Yes” in column four were used 
again by at least one county in the statewide elections in 2005.   40 
Appendix 3: Calculation of the Number of Misvotes 
Results from the regression, Votesharepdc = B0 + B1×Idc
adjacent + controls + εpdc, can be 
used to estimate the total number of misvotes cast by voters in the Recall Election. Let Idc
adjacent 
represent a vector of adjacency dummy variables, 
(I
north AS adjacent, I
south AS adjacent, I
east AS adjacent, I
west AS adjacent,  
I
north CB adjacent, I
south CB adjacent, I
east CB adjacent, I
west CB adjacent, 
I
north TM adjacent, I
south TM adjacent, I
east TM adjacent, I
west TM adjacent). 
By separately measuring adjacency misvoting for each major candidate and adjacency type, we 
identify the unique gain in voteshare when, for example, a candidate is north adjacent to Arnold 
Schwarzenegger.  This distinction is necessary because not all types of adjacency exist with 
equal frequency. 
Let F be a vector equal to: 
(F
north AS adjacent, F
south AS adjacent, F
east AS adjacent, F
west AS adjacent,  
F
north CB adjacent, F
south CB adjacent, F
east CB adjacent, F
west CB adjacent, 
F
north TM adjacent, F
south TM adjacent, F




north AS adjacent represents the average number of minor candidates that are located 
directly north of Arnold Schwarzenegger, weighted by the total votes cast in a precinct. In a 
given precinct, Schwarzenegger either has no north adjacent candidates (if Schwarzenegger is at 
the top of a ballot column) or one north adjacent (if Schwarzenegger is not at the top of a ballot 
column). Since F is an average across all precincts, F ranges between 0 and 1. One can think of 
F as correcting for the fact that adjacent candidates exist with unequal frequency. For example, 
north and south adjacent candidates always exist unless the major candidate is at the top or 
bottom  of  a  column  respectively.  However,  east  and west  adjacent  candidates  only  exist  on 
multi-column ballots. See Appendix 2 for detailed frequency statistics.   41 
If β1 is the coefficient vector derived from the regression specified above, misvotes as a 
percentage of total votes cast is equal to β1F. A simple calculation reveals that β1F equals 0.25 
with a standard error of 0.03. Thus misvotes accounted for 0.25% of all votes cast in the 2003 
California Recall Election.   42 
Tables 
 
Rank Candidate Voteshare No. Votes
1 Arnold Schwarzenegger 48.6 3,747,446
2 Cruz M. Bustamante 31.63 2,439,133
3 Tom McClintock 13.33 1,027,926
4 Peter Miguel Camejo 2.77 213,547
5 Arianna Huffington 0.55 42,654
6 Peter V. Ueberroth 0.29 22,267
7 Larry Flynt 0.2 15,489
8 Gary Coleman 0.16 12,712
9 George B. Schwartzman 0.14 10,960
10 Mary Cook 0.13 10,129
:
:
25 Edward Thomas Kennedy 0.0335 2,586
50 Michael J. Wozniak 0.0179 1,384
75 Scott A. Mednick 0.0103 791
100 Dennis Duggan McMahon 0.0067 517
135 Todd Richard Lewis 0.0022 172




Voteshare = (votes / total votes)×100
Adjacent 0.104** (0.018)
Adjacent × Schwarzenegger 0.088** (0.025)
Adjacent × Bustamante 0.143** (0.025)
Adjacent × McClintock 0.107* (0.045)









Robust  standard  errors,  adjusted  for  clustering  on  county×district×candidate  (19,800  clusters),  are  reported  in  parentheses. 
Significance levels: +: 10 percent; *: 5 percent; **: 1%. Adjacent equals one multiplied by the precinct level voteshare of the 
associated  major  candidate  if  a  minor  candidate  is  adjacent  to  a  major  candidate  and  zero  otherwise.  Schwarzenegger, 
Bustamante,  and  McClintock  are  dummy  variables  that  equal  one  if  a  minor  candidate  is  adjacent  to  major  candidates 
Schwarzenegger, Bustamante, and McClintock respectively. Observations are weighted by the total number of votes cast in a 
precinct. Controls are included for candidate fixed effects, candidate fixed effects interacted with demographic controls (%Black, 
%Hispanic, %Asian, %age 18-24, %age 65 plus, %in poverty, median household income (in $1000 per year), %HS graduates, 
%college  graduates,  %Democrat,  %Republican,  %other  party  affiliation,  %independent,  and  %lacking  English  fluency), 
candidate  fixed  effects  interacted  with  the  precinct-level  voteshares  of  major  candidates  Schwarzenegger,  Bustamante,  and 
McClintock and ballot position controls (dummy variables for first and last overall, on a ballot page, and in a ballot column) 
representing the ballot position of the minor candidate in each county-district. 
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Dependent Variable:
Voteshare = (votes / total votes)×100




Adjacent Dummy × CA Voteshare 0.112**
(0.019)
North Adjacent 0.082** 0.082**
(0.022) (0.022)












Horizontally Adjacent × Confusing Side 0.123**
(0.038)
Observations 1,817,904 1,817,904 1,817,904 1,817,904 1,817,904 1,817,904
R-Squared 0.8676 0.8676 0.8677 0.8676 0.8677 0.8677
Table 3: Robustness Checks
(6) (1) (4) (5) (2) (3)
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on county×district×candidate, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: +: 
10 percent; *: 5 percent; **: 1%. If a minor candidate is adjacent to a major candidate, CA voteshare equals the average statewide 
of the associated major candidate. North, South, East, and West Adjacent equal one multiplied by the precinct-level voteshare of 
the associated major candidate if a  minor candidate is north, south, east, or west adjacent respectively and zero otherwise. 
Diagonally Adjacent and Punch card Adjacent equal one multiplied by the precinct-level voteshare of the associated major 
candidate if a minor candidate diagonally borders a major candidate (i.e. is listed to the northeast, northwest, southeast, or 
southwest of a major candidate) or is adjacent to a major candidate on a punch card, respectively. Horizontally Adjacent equals 
the precinct level voteshare of the associated major candidate if a minor candidate is east or west adjacent and zero otherwise. 
Confusing Side is a dummy variable equaling one if the minor candidate is horizontally adjacent to a major candidate and listed 
in the column with selection boxes closest to the name of the major candidate. All other controls and variables are as described in 
Table 2. 
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Dependent Variable:
Voteshare = 
(votes / total votes)×100
Adjacent 0.6368** 0.0544** 0.3353**
(0.1012) (0.0162) (0.0467)
Adjacent × % HS Graduates -0.0062** 24% 60% -0.223
(0.0013)
Adjacent × % College Graduates -0.0056** 12% 71% -0.330
(0.0010)
Adjacent × % Black 0.0005 0% 18% 0.009
(0.0009)
Adjacent × % Hispanic 0.0038** 4% 65% 0.232
(0.0008)
Adjacent × % Asian 0.0003 1% 36% 0.011
(0.0006)
Adjacent × % Republican -0.0025** 9% 60% -0.128
(0.0007)
Adjacent × % Other Party 0.0000 3% 21% 0.000
(0.0020)
Adjacent × % Independent -0.0068** 0% 25% -0.170
(0.0016)
Observations 1,817,904 1,817,904 1,817,904




Table 4: Overall Effect of Precinct Demographic Characteristics on Misvoting
5th                   
Percentile
95th 
Percentile (1) (2) (3)
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on county×district×candidate, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: +: 
10  percent;  *:  5  percent;  **:  1%.  Omitted  Categories:  %HS  dropouts,  %other  ethnicity,  %Democrat.  %HS  graduates  and 
%college graduates represent the percentage of precinct residents with high school degrees and college degrees (%HS graduates 
does not include those who have also graduated from college). %Black, Hispanic, Asian represent the percentage of precinct 
residents  that  identify  themselves  as  Black,  Hispanic,  or  Asian  respectively  (the  omitted  group  includes  White  and  other 
ethnicities).  %Democrat,  %Republican,  and  %Other  Party  represent  the  percentage  of  registered  voters  that  are  officially 
registered as a Democrat, Republican, or other party member; all remaining voters are included in %Independent. Controls are 
included for Techd and Adjacentpdcm×Techd where Techd is a vector of dummy variables representing the 11 brands of voting 
technology used in the Recall Election. All other controls and variables are as described in Table 2. 
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Dependent Variable:
Voteshare =                                    
(votes / total votes)×100
Adjacent 0.2328** 0.0964** 0.0891** 0.1240** 0.1024**
(0.0321) (0.0126) (0.0155) (0.0163) (0.0153)
Adjacent × X -0.0033** 0.0041** 0.0073** 0.0007* 0.0045**
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0015)
Observations 1,817,904 1,817,904 1,817,904 1,817,904 1,817,904
R-Squared 0.8679 0.8679 0.8679 0.8679 0.8679
5th Percentile of X 12K 1% 0% 7% 3%
95th Percentile of X 55K 33% 27% 35% 14%
Difference in Adjacency 
Effect -0.1419 0.1312 0.1971 0.0196 0.0495
Table 5:  Overall Effect of Precinct Demographic Characteristics on Misvoting (continued)
(5) X =                             
% Age 18 to 24
(1) X =          
Income (K)
(2) X =                 
% In Poverty
(3) X =                  
% Lacking 
English Fluency
(4) X =              
% Age 65 Plus
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on county×district×candidate, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: +: 
10 percent; *: 5 percent; **: 1%. Income represents median household income of precinct residents in $1000 per year. %In 
Poverty  represents  the  percentage  of  households  in  a  precinct  below  the  census  poverty  line.  %Lacking  English  Fluency 
represents the percentage of precinct residents lacking fluency in English. %Age 65 Plus and %Age 18 to 24 represents the 
percentage of registered voters in a precinct above the age of 65 and between the ages of 18 and 24 respectively. All other 




Voteshare = (votes / total votes)×100
Adjacent  0.7046** (0.1554)
Adjacent × % Black -0.0001 (0.0009)
Adjacent × % Hispanic 0.0022+ (0.0012)
Adjacent × % Asian 0.0014* (0.0007)
Adjacent × % Age 18 24 -0.0015 (0.0011)
Adjacent × % Age 65 Plus 0.0012* (0.0005)
Adjacent × % In Poverty 0.0010* (0.0005)
Adjacent × Income (K) -0.0002 (0.0005)
Adjacent × % HS Graduates -0.0086** (0.0023)
Adjacent × % College Graduates -0.0068** (0.0017)
Adjacent × % Republican 0.0010 (0.0011)
Adjacent × % Other Party 0.0041+ (0.0023)
Adjacent × % Independent -0.0004 (0.0016)
Adjacent × % Lacking English Fluency -0.0066* (0.0031)
Observations 1,817,904
R-Squared 0.8680
Table 6:  Partial Effect of Precinct Demographic Characteristics on Misvoting
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on county×district×candidate, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: +: 
10 percent; *: 5 percent; **: 1%. Omitted Categories: %Other Ethnicity, %HS Dropouts, %Democrat. All other controls and 
variables are as described in Tables 4 and 5. 
 







Adjacent × Diebold Accu Vote OS 0.178** 0.175**
(0.041) (0.034)
Adjacent × ES&S 550 Optech 0.061** 0.082**
(0.015) (0.018)
Adjacent × ES&S Optech Eagle 0.076** 0.108**
(0.018) (0.027)
Adjacent × Hart Ballot Now 0.046** 0.065**
(0.015) (0.014)
Adjacent × Mark A Vote 0.065* 0.074**
(0.026) (0.027)
Adjacent × Sequoia Optech 0.106** 0.095**
(0.024) (0.023)
Adjacent × Diebold AccuVote TS 0.015 0.008
(0.023) (0.033)
Adjacent × Sequoia Edge 0.099** 0.095**
(0.020) (0.017)
Adjacent × Datavote 0.088** 0.095**
(0.025) (0.024)
Adjacent × Pollstar 0.225** 0.241**
(0.035) (0.035)
Adjacent × Votomatic 0.207** 0.212**
(0.019) (0.018)
Demographic Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 0.8677 0.8679 0.8679 0.8680



















Adjacent × optical scan
Adjacent × touch screen
Table 7:  Interactions with Voting Technology
Adjacent × punch card
Dependent Variable:
Voteshare = (votes / total votes)×100
(1) (2) (4) (3)
Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on county×district×candidate, are reported in parentheses. Significance levels: +: 
10 percent; *: 5 percent; **: 1%. Controls are included for the direct effect of each technology variable. Demographic controls 
include Adjacentpdcm × Demopd where Demopd is a vector of precinct-level variables representing %Black, %Hispanic, %Asian, 
%age 18-24, %age 65 plus, %in poverty, median household income (K), %HS graduates, %college graduates, %Democrat, 
%Republican, %other party affiliation, %independent, and %lacking English fluency. All other variables and controls are as 
described in Table 2. 
 